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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the growth and welfare implications of monetary policy in a Schum-
peterian economy with two vertically related sectors in which the R&D investment of these sectors
are subject to a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint. In the well-established tradition of R&D-based
endogenous growth, such as Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt
(1992), firms engage in research activities in either the downstream sector (i.e., the final-goods sec-
tor) or the upstream sector (i.e., the intermediate-goods sector). In their line of argument, policy
instruments can only affect the resource allocation in R&D for either of these sectors with manufac-
turing. However, existing evidence strongly supports the fact that both downstream and upstream
firms invest in R&D activities to develop innovations that upgrade their technologies. For example,
the early study by Nelson (1986) finds that both upstream and downstream industries have signifi-
cant contributions to the US R&D intensity. A recent study by Pillai (2013) shows that upstream
semiconductor equipment firms like Nikon, Canon, Applied Materials and ASML invent new gen-
erations of capital equipment to allow microprocessor firms like Intel and AMD to invent higher
performance microprocessors. More recently, Yang (2017) shows that in the US smartphone market,
upstream chipset firms (such as Qualcomm) invest to conduct innovations, with which downstream
handset markers (such as Samsung) innovate to improve their hardware. Therefore, the feature of
R&D sectors for vertical industries needs stressing in the R&D-based growth model.
Furthermore, another important feature of the latest literature on money and R&D is that R&D
investment is heavily affected by liquidity requirements. Brown et al. (2012) find that the increase in
corporate cash flow in 1990s is the result of firms’ smoothing of R&D expenditures by maintaining
a buffer stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves. Falato and Sim (2014) use the US firm-level
data to demonstrate that firms hold cash to finance their R&D investment due to the presence
of financing frictions. Brown and Petersen (2015) reveal that firms tend to use cash to finance
investment in R&D but not in capital. A recent study by Lyandres and Palazzo (2016) finds that
the sharp increase in the the average cash-to-assets ratio for US firms since the mid-1980s is driven
almost only by firms which invest heavily in R&D. Therefore, the presence of a CIA constraint on
R&D also needs stressing in the R&D-based growth model.
To take into account the above two features on R&D, we build up a scale-invariant version
of the quality-ladder model in which both the upstream and downstream sectors devote resources
in R&D activities and money demand is incorporated into the model through a CIA constraint
on R&D investments in these vertically related sectors. Our main results can be summarized as
follows. Under the CIA constraints on the upstream and downstream R&D, there are two effects of
an increase in the nominal interest rate on economic growth. First, a higher nominal interest rate
would generate a growth-retarding effect through decreasing the sectoral levels of R&D because
the cost of borrowing for R&D investments rises. Second, a higher nominal interest rate would
generate a growth-enhancing effect through reallocating the resources (i.e., labor in this study)
from the more-cash-constrained R&D sector to the less one (i.e., a cross-sector effect to simulate
economic growth). As long as the markup and/or the strength of the CIA constraint on the less
constrained R&D sector is relatively large, the growth-enhancing effect will dominate the growth-
retarding effect at low levels of nominal interest rate. Nevertheless, as the nominal interest rate
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increases, this domination will be gradually mitigated and finally reversed. Hence, the nominal
interest rate would have an overall inverted-U effect on economic growth, as documented in recent
empirical studies, such as López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) and Eggoh and Khan (2014).1
In addition, we explore the long-run implications of monetary policy on social welfare by com-
paring our results to the monetary policy rule proposed by Friedman (1969) in which the optimal
nominal interest rate is zero. There has been a large body of literature that analyzes the opti-
mality of the Friedman rule in different economic environments.2 However, until recent, several
industrialized countries announced a very low (close to zero) level of nominal interest rate target,3
and a growing number of studies attempt to incorporate money demand into R&D-based growth
models to address this stylized fact by finding the condition for the suboptimality of the Friedman
rule, such as Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Hori (2017). In this paper, we assume that both vertically
related industries conduct R&D activities and reexamine the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the (sub)optimality of the Friedman rule by relating the underinvestment and overinvestment
of R&D in the decentralized economy. We find that this relationship is crucially determined by
the presence of CIA constraints, the relative productivity between upstream R&D and downstream
R&D, and the strength of markup. In particularly, in the presence of the CIA constraint on a
sectoral R&D, when the relative productivity of this sectoral R&D is low (high), then R&D over-
investment/underinvestment is sufficient/necessary (necessary/sufficient) for the Friedman rule to
be suboptimal/optimal. Nonetheless, in the presence of the CIA constraints with equal strength
on both sectoral R&D, R&D overinvestment (underinvestment) becomes sufficient (necessary) for
the Friedman rule to be suboptimal (optimal), regardless of the relative productivity of the sectoral
R&D is low or high. Moreover, the strength of markup determines the degree of R&D over- or
under-investment, when it is a necessary condition, to generate the suboptimality of the Friedman
rule.
We also perform a quantitative analysis in which the current two-R&D-sector model is calibrated
to the US economy to evaluate the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy. The benchmark
case shows that a zero-interest-rate policy (i.e., the Friedman rule) maximizes economic growth and
social welfare, and the welfare gain by optimizing the nominal interest rate from the decentralized
equilibrium can be as large as 1% of consumption. Furthermore, to be consistent with more empirical
evidence and to test the robustness of the analytical results as well, we conduct several sensitivity
checks by varying the CIA parameters, markup, and the R&D labor ratio, to show the cases in
which the growth-maximizing or welfare-maximizing rate of nominal interest becomes positive (e.g.,
the Friedman rule can be suboptimal).
This study contributes to the growth-theoretic literature in R&D and monetary policy that
features CIA requirements. The pioneer work by Marquis and Reffett (1994) firstly introduces a
CIA constraint on consumption into the Romer (1990) type variety expanding model to investigate
1See Chu et al. (2017) for an analysis of the CIA constraint on R&D in a Schumpeterian growth model with
endogenous entry of heterogeneous firms, which also yields an inverted-U effect of monetary policy on economic
growth.
2See the discussion regarding the optimality of the Friedman rule in, for example, Gahvari (2007, 2012) for
overlapping generations models, Ho et al. (2007) for inflation taxation, and Lai and Chin (2010) for an open economy.
3Huang et al. (2017) document the facts for a low level of nominal interest rate target in the large economies such
as US, Japan, and China during 2008–2015.
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the effects of monetary policy, which proves that the Friedman rule is optimal. Unlike their model,
the current study considers a Schumpeterian growth model and analyzes the effects of monetary
policy via a CIA constraint on R&D. Our study is closely related to Chu and Cozzi (2014), who
show that the overinvestment of R&D in the market economy is the necessary condition for the
suboptimality of the Friedman rule in a Schumpeterian growth model with CIA on R&D. However,
their result is based on the setting with R&D activities in only the intermediate-goods sector (i.e.,
the downstream sector in this study), so raising the nominal interest rate yields only a reallocating
effect on resources from R&D to consumption and manufacturing. The current study complements
their study by considering a more realistic setting in which R&D activities are engaged in both the
intermediate-goods and final-goods sectors. Under this setting, in addition to the reallocative effect
as in Chu and Cozzi (2014), raising the nominal interest rate generates a cross-R&D-sector effect
between the upstream and downstream R&D sectors, which makes both R&D overinvestment and
underinvestment possible to lead the optimal nominal interest rate to be positive. Moreover, Huang
et al. (2015) and Chu and Ji (2016) explore the effects of monetary policy via CIA constraints
on R&D in a Schumpeterian growth with endogenous market structure, but they do not consider
vertical sectors in which firms invest in R&D as in the present study. Therefore, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes monetary policy in a growth-theoretic framework
featuring R&D activities for vertical industries in a cash-in-advance economy.
Additionally, this study contributes to a small but growing literature that investigates the effects
of government policy in endogenous growth models with two R&D sectors. For example, as for R&D
subsidies, Li (2000) analyzes the effectiveness of R&D subsidies on stimulating economic growth in
a two-R&D-sector model with both fully endogenous growth and semi-endogenous growth, whereas
Segerstrom (2000) completely characterizes the effects of R&D subsidies on long-run growth in an
endogenous growth model with both vertical R&D and horizontal R&D. As for patent policy, Goh
and Olivier (2002) explore optimal patent protection in a variety expanding growth model where
firms in both the upstream and downstream sectors engage in R&D, whereas Chu (2011) addresses
a similar issue in a quality-ladder growth model where firms in two horizontal final-goods sectors
(i.e., the downstream sectors) engage in R&D. Consequently, our paper complements the above
interesting studies by focusing on the role of monetary policy in a two-R&D-sector economy.4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup. Section
3 characterizes the decentralized equilibrium and analyzes the growth effect of monetary policy.
Section 4 explores the welfare effects of monetary policy and derives the optimal monetary policy.
Section 5 provides a quantitative analysis. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Model
In this section, we present the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. We extend a version of
the quality-ladder model in Grossman and Helpman (1991) by allowing for firms to invest in R&D
to develop innovations in both upstream and downstream sectors as in Goh and Olivier (2002)
4Zheng et al. (2018) also examine the growth and welfare implications of monetary policy in a Schumpeterian
growth model with two R&D sectors. Nevertheless, R&D investments are conducted to develop vertical and horizontal
innovations in their study instead of upstream and downstream industries in the current study.
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and by introducing money demand via CIA constraints on R&D investments as in Chu and Cozzi
(2014). Moreover, we allow for population growth and remove scale effects in the Schumpeterian
model by incorporating a dilution effect on R&D productivity as in Laincz and Peretto (2006). The
nominal interest rate serves as the instrument for monetary policy and the effects of monetary policy
are examined by considering the implications of altering the rate of nominal interest on economic
growth and social welfare.
2.1 Households
At time t, each household has a population size of Nt, which grows at the rate of n ≥ 0 such
that N˙t = nNt. There is a unit continuum of identical households, and the lifetime utility function
of each member is given by
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtutdt, (1)
where ρ > 0 represents the discount rate and ut denotes the instantaneous utility. The law of motion
for assets of each household member is
a˙t + m˙t = (rt − n)at + wt + itbt + τt − et − (pit + n)mt, (2)
where at is the asset value, rt is the real interest rate, and each individual inelastically supplies
one unit of labor at the rate wt. et is the expenditure on consumption. τt denotes the lump-sum
transfer from the government, pit is the inflation rate the reflects the cost of holding money, and mt
is the money balance that the household member holds in order to facilitate entrepreneurs’ loans bt,
which finance the R&D investment on the return rate of it. Therefore, the cash-in-advance (CIA)
constraint is bt ≤ mt.
The static utility function is ut = lnct, where ct is the level of consumption whose price is
normalized to unity. Consumption is derived by aggregating a unit continuum of differentiated final
goods yt(j) indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] such that
ct = exp
(∫ 1
0
ln yt(j)dj
)
. (3)
There are two stages for utility maximization. In the first stage, each household member de-
cides the allocation of expenditure across the unit measure of final products. Each household’s
expenditure is given by
et = ptct, (4)
where pt is the price of ct. Given this price, each individual chooses an optimal level of yt(j) to
maximize the payoffs of deriving consumption. Solving the static optimization problem gives rise
to the demand for the differentiated final goods yj,t as follows:
yt(j) = et/py,t(j), (5)
where py,t(j) is the price of yt(j).
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In the second stage, the household member allocates her expenditure across the planning horizon.
The optimal problem is to maximize the discounted utility in (1) subject to the budget constraint
in (2) and the CIA constraint. The optimality condition for the household’s consumption yields the
familiar Euler equation
e˙t
et
= rt − ρ− n. (6)
Finally, using the optimality condition for real money balance mt, it is straightforward to derive
the Fisher equation such that it = pit + rt.
2.2 Final Goods
As for each differentiated final good j, the total demand equals its supply such that
Yt(j) = Ntyt(j). (7)
In addition, the aggregate amount of the final goods in this economy is given by a unit continuum
of the differentiated final good Yt(j):
Yt = exp
(∫ 1
0
lnYt(j)dj
)
. (8)
The differentiated final goods in each industry j is produced by a monopolistic leader who holds
a patent on the latest innovation and uses a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by
k ∈ [0, 1]. This leader’s products are replaced by the products of a new entrant who has a more
advanced innovation due to the Arrow replacement effect. The current leader’s production function
is
Yt(j) = z
qy,t(j)exp
(∫ 1
0
lnxt(j, k)dk
)
, (9)
where the parameter z > 1 measures the step size of each quality improvement, qy,t(j) denotes the
number of innovations between time 0 and time t, and xt(j, k) is the quantity of intermediate good
k used for final good j. Thus, the marginal cost of producing each final goods is
mcy,t(j) =
Px,t
zqy,t(j)
, (10)
where Px,t ≡ exp
(∫ 1
0 ln px,t(k)dk
)
is the price index for the intermediate goods and px,t(k) is the
price of intermediate good k.
In each industry of differentiated final goods, the current and previous leaders engage in Bertrand
competition. Following previous studies such as Goh and Olivier (2002), Iwaisako and Futagami
(2013), and Yang (2018), this model assumes that intellectual property rights protect inventions
in the form of incomplete patent breadth. Therefore, patent breadth enables the current leader to
charge a markup µ > 1 over the marginal cost, and the profit-maximizing price is given by
py,t(j) = µ
Px,t
zqy,t(j)
. (11)
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The monopolistic profit of each differentiated final-goods producer is identical and is given by
Πy,t = Πy,t(j) = (µ− 1)Yt(j)py,t(j)
µ
=
(
µ− 1
µ
)
etNt, (12)
where the second equality and the third equality are obtained by using (12) and (5), respectively.
Then, using the definition of price index Px,t along with (10), (11), and (12) yields the demand for
each intermediate good k:
xt(k) =
∫ 1
0
xt(j, k)dj =
etNt
µpx,t(k)
. (13)
2.3 Intermediate Goods
The environment of the intermediate-goods sector is similar to that of the final-goods sector.
Each industry in this sector is temporarily dominated by a monopolist holding the latest innovation,
and the industry leadership is replaced by an entrant who holds a new invention. However, the
production structure of this sector is different from the previous sector since intermediate goods are
produced by manufacturing labor. Specifically, the production function for the current intermediate-
goods producer in industry k is given by
xt(k) = z
qx,t(k)Lx,t(k), (14)
where the step size of quality improvement is identical to that in the final-goods sector, qx,t(k) is
the number of innovation as of time t, and Lx,t(k) is the employment level of production in industry
k. Given the pricing strategy of the current leaders in this sector, the profit-maximizing price is
again a constant markup over the marginal cost such that
px,t(k) = µmcx,t(k) = µ
wt
zqx,t(k)
. (15)
Accordingly, the monopolistic profit for each intermediate-goods producer is
Πx,t = Πx,t(k) =
(µ− 1)wt
zqx,t(k)
xt(k) =
(
µ− 1
µ
)
etNt
µ
, (16)
where the second equality and the third one are obtained by using (15)-(16) and (5), respectively.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show the production-labor income in the industry of intermediate
k:
wtLx,t(k) =
1
µ
px,t(k)xt(k) =
etNt
µ2
, (17)
and therefore the labor demand for the intermediate good k is given by
Lx,t(k) =
etNt
µ2wt
. (18)
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2.4 Innovations and R&D
The environments for R&D firms that conduct innovations for the final-goods sector and the
intermediate-goods sector are the same as follows. The expected value of owning the most recent
innovation in the industry j (k) of the final- (intermediate-) goods sector is denoted as vy,t(j)
(vx,t(k)). Following the standard literature, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium (see, for example,
Cozzi et al. (2007)). This implies that given Πy,t(j) = Πy,t (Πx,t(k) = Πx,t), it follows that vy,t(j) =
vy,t (vx,t(k) = vx,t). Denote by λy,t (λx,t) the aggregate-level Poisson arrival rate of innovations for
final- (intermediate-) goods. Then, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for vy,t (vx,t) is
rtvs,t = Πs,t + v˙s,t − λs,tvs,t, (19)
which is the no-arbitrage condition for the value of the asset in sector s = y, x, respectively. In
equilibrium, the return on the asset rtvs,t equals the sum of the flow profits Πs,t, the capital gain
v˙s,t, and the potential losses λs,tvs,t when creative destruction takes place.
New innovations in each industry of the final- and intermediate-goods sectors are invented by a
unit continuum of R&D firms indexed by θ ∈ [0, 1] and ϑ ∈ [0, 1], respectively, and each of the R&D
firms in sectors y and x employs R&D labor Lyr,t(θ) and Lxr,t(ϑ) for producing inventions. This study
follows the existing literature, such as Chu and Cozzi (2014), Huang et al. (2015), and Huang et al.
(2017) to incorporate a CIA constraint on R&D investment at time t, such that households lend the
θ-th (ϑ-th) entrepreneur an amount Byt (θ) = b
y
t (θ)Nt (Bxt (ϑ) = bxt (ϑ)Nt) of money, which finances
the wage payment for the downstream-R&D labor wtL
y
r,t(θ) (for upstream-R&D labor wtLxr,t(ϑ))
on the return rate of it. Thus, the expected profit of the χ-th R&D firm, where χ = θ, ϑ, is
Πsr,t(χ) = vs,tλs,t(χ)− (1 + ξsit)wtLsr,t(χ), (20)
where ξs = ξy, ξx ∈ [0, 1] is the respective strength of the CIA constraint on downstream (upstream)
R&D. Moreover, we formulate the firm-level arrival rate of innovations λs,t(χ) to be
λs,t(χ) = ϕ¯s,tL
s
r,t(χ) =
ϕs
Nt
Lsr,t(χ), (21)
where the specification ϕ¯s,t = ϕs/Nt captures the dilution effect that removes scale effects as in
Laincz and Peretto (2006) and ϕs = ϕy, ϕx is the productivity parameter for downstream and
upstream R&D, respectively. In equilibrium, the aggregate-level arrival rate of innovations is thus
given by λs,t =
∫ 1
0 λs,t(χ)dχ = ϕsL
s
r,t/Nt. Then, free entry into the R&D sectors implies the
following zero-expected-profit condition:
vs,tλs,t = (1 + ξsit)wtL
s
r,t. (22)
This equation is a condition that pins down the allocation of labors between production and R&D.
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2.5 Monetary Authority
Denote the nominal money supply by Mt and its growth rate by Φt ≡ M˙t/Mt, respectively.
Accordingly, the real money balance is given bymtNt = Mt/pt, where pt is the price of consumption.
Then, consider that the growth rate of money supply Φt serves as a policy instrument that can
be controlled by monetary authority. In this case, the rate of inflation is determined by pit =
Φt− m˙t/mt− n. Additionally, combining this condition with the Fisher equation (i.e., it = pit + rt)
yields the one-to-one relationship between the nominal interest rate and the nominal money supply,
such that5
it = Φt + ρ. (23)
Given this result, throughout the rest of this study, we will use it to represent the instrument
of monetary policy for simplicity. Finally, the monetary authority redistributes the increase in
money supply as a lump-sum transfer to the households, namely, τtNt = M˙t/pt = ΦtmtNt =
[(pit + n)mt + m˙t]Nt.
3 Decentralized Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of
(a) a sequence of allocations [ct,mt, Yt(j), yt(j), xt(k), Lx,t(k), L
y
r,t(θ), L
x
r,t(ϑ)]
∞
t=0,j,k,θ,ϑ∈[0,1] and
(b) a sequence of prices [rt, py,t(j), px,t(k), wt, vy,t, vx,t]∞t=0,j,k∈[0,1]. Moreover, at each instance of
time,
• households produce [ct] using [yt(j)] as inputs to maximize payoffs taking [py,t(j)] as given;
• households choose [ct] to maximize their utility taking [rt, it, wt] as given;
• monopolistic leaders for final goods produce [Yt(j)] and choose [py,t(j)] to maximize profits
taking [px,t(k)] as given;
• monopolistic leaders for intermediate goods produce [xt(k)] and choose [px,t(k), Lx,t(k)] to
maximize profits taking [wt] as given;
• competitive downstream-R&D firms choose [Lyr,t(θ)] to maximize profits taking [wt, vy,t] as
given;
• competitive upstream-R&D firms choose [Lxr,t(ϑ)] to maximize profits taking [wt, vx,t] as given;
• the labor market clears such that Lx,t + Lyr,t + Lxr,t = Nt;
• the innovations value adds up to households’ asset value such that vx,t + vy,t = atNt;
• the R&D entrepreneurs finance their wage payments through borrowing such that ξywtLyr,t +
ξxwtL
x
r,t = btNt; and
• monetary authority balances its budget such that τtNt = (it − ρ)mtNt.
3.1 Balanced Growth Path
This section characterizes the decentralized equilibrium for this model and show that the econ-
omy grows in a unique and stable balanced growth path (BGP). To facilitate this result, we first
5On the balanced growth path, which will be shown in Section 3.1, ct, et, andmt grow at the same rate of rt−ρ−n
according to the Euler equation.
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derive the growth rate of aggregate technology gt. Using (9), (10), and (15) yields Yt = Zy,tZx,tLx,t,
where Zy,t and Zx,t are defined as the level of technology in the downstream sector and in the
upstream sector, where lnZy,t ≡ lnz
∫ 1
0 qt(j)dj = lnz
∫ t
0 λy,ιdι and lnZx,t ≡ lnz
∫ 1
0 qt(k)dk =
lnz
∫ t
0 λx,κdκ, respectively, and the second equalities are obtained by the law of large numbers.
Then, differentiating these two equations with respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate
technology given by
gt =
Z˙y,t
Zy,t
+
Z˙x,t
Zx,t
= (ϕyl
y
r,t + ϕxl
x
r,t)lnz, (24)
where the second equality is obtained by using (21) and lyr,t ≡ Lyr,t/Nt and lxr,t ≡ Lxr,t/Nt are defined
as downstream-R&D labor per capita and upstream-R&D labor per capta, respectively. Similarly,
lx,t ≡ Lx,t/Nt is defined as manufacturing labor per capita.
For an arbitrary path of the nominal interest rate [it]∞t=0, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Holding constant i, the economy jumps to a unique and stable balanced growth path.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2 Equilibrium Allocations and the Growth Effect
As implied by Proposition 1, given a constant i, the equilibrium labor allocations {lx, lyr,t, lxr,t} are
stationary along the BGP. Using the zero-expected-profit condition for upstream R&D (22) and the
production-labor income in the intermediate-goods sector (17) yields vy,tλy,t = (1+ξyi)Ntet/(µ2lx,t)
implying v˙y,t/vy,t = e˙t/et+n. Combining this result with (19) and (7) and imposing the BGP implies
Πy/vy = ρ+ λy. Then, substituting this equation into (22) and applying (12) and (21) derives the
relationship between lyr and lx such that
lyr =
µ(µ− 1)lx
1 + ξyi
− ρ
ϕy
, (25)
which is the first equation to solve for {lx, lyr,t, lxr,t}. Following a similar logic, we can use (7), (16),
(17), (19), (21), and (22) to derive the second equation, which is the relationship between lxr to lx
given by
lxr =
(µ− 1)lx
1 + ξxi
− ρ
ϕx
. (26)
The last equation is the labor-market-clearing condition such that
lx + l
x
r + l
y
r = 1. (27)
Thus, solving (25)-(27) yields the equilibrium labor allocations as follows:
lx =
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
1 + µ−11+ξxi +
µ(µ−1)
1+ξyi
, (28)
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lyr =
µ(µ−1)
1+ξyi
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
1 + µ−11+ξxi +
µ(µ−1)
1+ξyi
− ρ
ϕy
, (29)
lxr =
µ−1
1+ξxi
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
1 + µ−11+ξxi +
µ(µ−1)
1+ξyi
− ρ
ϕx
. (30)
In these equilibrium labor allocations, (28) shows that production labor lx is increasing in the
nominal interest rate i, because a higher i raises the cost of borrowing for R&D investments, which
reallocates the labor from R&D to manufacturing. Nevertheless, (29) reveals that there are two
effects of i on the downstream-R&D labor lyr . On the one hand, i has a negative effect on lyr due
to the reallocation of labor to production as aforementioned. On the other hand, i has a negative
(positive) effect on lyr if ξy is greater (smaller) than ξx, namely downstream R&D is more (less)
constrained to CIA than upstream R&D. This creates another re-allocative effect of labor between
the two R&D sectors (i.e., a cross-R&D-sector effect). Whether a higher i increases or decreases
lyr depends on the relative magnitude of ξy and ξx and the level of markup µ. Specifically, when
ξy ≥ ξx, the second effect is negative and thus reinforces the first effect, making lyr to be decreasing
in i. When ξy < ξx, the second effect becomes positive. In this case, if µ is sufficiently large
(small), markup strengthens (dampens) the second positive effect and induces it to dominate (to be
dominated by) the first negative effect. As a result, lyr is increasing (decreasing) in i. Furthermore,
(30) shows that i has two effects on the upstream-R&D labor lxr , and the analysis of the overall
impact is analogous to that for the impact of i on lyr .6
Therefore, the above result and (24) imply that the effect of the nominal interest rate i on the
growth rate of technology g = lnz(ϕyl
y
r + ϕxl
x
r ) is mixed, and it is determined by the impacts of i
on the levels of labor lyr and lyr in the two R&D sectors in addition to the productivity parameters
ϕy and ϕx. Using (28)-(30) and differentiating (24) with respect to i yields
∂g
∂i
=
(
ϕy
∂lyr
∂i
+ ϕx
∂lxr
∂i
)
ln z
=
(µ− 1) ln z
Λ2
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
){
ϕyµ[(µ− 1)ξx − (µ+ ξxi(2 + ξxi))ξy]
+ϕx[µ(µ− 1)ξy − (µ(µ− 1) + (1 + ξyi)2)ξx]
}
,
(31)
where Λ ≡ (1 + ξyi)(1 + ξxi) + (µ − 1)(1 + ξyi) + µ(µ − 1)(1 + ξxi). It can be see that ∂g/∂i is
decreasing in i, namely g is a concave function of i. In particular, if ∂g/∂i|i=0 = µϕy[(µ − 1)ξx −
µξy] + ϕx
[
µ(µ− 1)ξy − (µ2 − µ+ 1)ξx
]
> 0, then the growth rate of aggregate technology g and
the nominal interest rate i exhibit an inverted-U relationship. Intuitively, R&D labor in the less
CIA constrained sector tends to be increasing in the nominal interest rate i in the support of a
large markup. Together with a large sectoral productivity parameter, the less constrained sector
yields a sufficiently high (positive) growth rate of technology that can dominate the (negative)
growth rate of technology in the more constrained sector where R&D labor is decreasing in i.
6When ξx ≥ ξy, lxr is decreasing in i, whereas when ξx < ξy, lxr is increasing (decreasing) in i if µ is sufficiently
large (small).
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Thus, monetary policy is growth-enhancing in this case. Notwithstanding, as i increases, the above
domination of the less constrained sector becomes weaker since the reallocation of labor from R&D
to production keeps strengthening the negative growth rate of technology in the more constrained
sector. Then, monetary policy turns to be growth-retarding. Notice that if the markup is small
and/or the productivity parameter in the less constrained sector is small, the growth-increasing part
of monetary policy will be invalid; g can only be decreasing in i.
Proposition 2. The growth rate of aggregate technology is concave in the nominal interest rate. If
µϕy[(µ − 1)ξx − µξy] + ϕx
[
µ(µ− 1)ξy − (µ2 − µ+ 1)ξx
]
> 0 holds, then the nominal interest rate
generates a non-monotonic effect on economic growth.
Proof. Proven in the text.
3.3 Socially Optimal Allocations
Imposing balanced growth on (1) yields
U =
1
ρ
(
lnc0 +
g
ρ
)
(32)
where c0 = Zx,0Zy,0lx and g = lnz(ϕyl
y
r + ϕxl
x
r ). Dropping the exogenous terms Zx,0 and Zy,0 and
maximizing (32) subject to the resource constraint for labor lx + l
y
r + lxr = 1 yields the first-best
allocations denoted with a superscript asterisk:
l∗x = min
[
ρ
ϕylnz
,
ρ
ϕxlnz
]
, (33)
ly∗r = max
[
1− ρ
ϕylnz
, 0
]
, (34)
lx∗r = max
[
1− ρ
ϕxlnz
, 0
]
. (35)
The socially optimal outcome implies that technology advances in the downstream and upstream
sectors are perfectly substitutable. Therefore, a corner solution arises for the first-best labor allo-
cations in the sense that the social optimum only allocates labor to the R&D sector with a higher
level of productivity.7 Specifically, suppose ϕy > ϕx, that is, innovative activities in the downstream
sector are more productive, then devoting all R&D labor to this sector is socially optimal. As a
result, the labor in the upstream R&D sector is zero, implying that economic growth in the social
optimum only depends on downstream innovations. In contrast, for ϕy < ϕx, the situation reverses
such that R&D labor is only allocated to the upstream sector but none to the downstream sector.
7Suppose that the productivity is identical between the two R&D sectors such that ϕx = ϕy = ϕ, then this implies
that the first-best production labor L∗x = ρ/(ϕlnz). In this case, one condition is lost to determine the relationship
between the two first-best R&D labor allocations Ly∗r and Lx∗r . In other words, any combination of {Ly∗r , Lx∗r }
satisfying Ly∗r +Lx∗r = 1−ρ/(ϕlnz) can be a solution. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that ϕy and ϕx differs
to facilitate the welfare analysis that follows, and thus, the possibility of ϕy = ϕx is excluded.
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4 Optimal Monetary Policy and the Friedman Rule
In this section, we analyze optimal monetary policy and examine the conditions under which
the Friedman rule is (sub)optimal. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we consider the cases in which the CIA
constraint only on upstream R&D or downstream R&D is present, respectively. In Section 4.3, we
consider the case in which the model features an equal CIA constraint on both R&D sectors. We
use i∗ to denote the optimal rate of nominal interest, which maximizes social welfare.
4.1 CIA Constraint on Downstream R&D
In this subsection, we consider optimal monetary policy with the CIA constraint only down-
stream R&D, which is captured by ξx = 0. We also normalize the CIA constraint on upstream
R&D to unity (i.e., ξy = 1) for simplicity in this case. Furthermore, we consider this case by taking
into account both ϕy > ϕx and ϕy < ϕx, since the relative R&D productivity between downstream
R&D and upstream R&D matter in the existence of the labor allocations of R&D from the social
perspective.
Imposing ξx = 0, the equilibrium labor allocations are simplified to
lx =
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
µ+ µ(µ−1)1+i
, (36)
lyr =
µ(µ−1)
1+i
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
µ+ µ(µ−1)1+i
− ρ
ϕy
, (37)
lxr =
(µ− 1)
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
µ+ µ(µ−1)1+i
− ρ
ϕx
. (38)
From (36)-(38), it is easy to see that production labor lx is increasing in the nominal interest
rate i, whereas downstream- (upstream-) R&D labor is decreasing (increasing) in i. Given the fact
that downstream R&D is more constrained by CIA than upstream R&D (i.e., ξy = 1 > ξx = 0), the
effect of i now operates through the CIA constraint on the downstream R&D sector so that a higher
i increases the cost of downstream R&D relative to upstream R&D, leading to a labor reallocation
from downstream R&D to upstream R&D and manufacturing.
Accordingly, substituting (36)-(38) into (32) yields the lifetime utility U along the BGP. Then,
to examine the (sub)optimality of the Friedman rule in this case, differentiating U with respect to
i and evaluating ∂U/∂i at i = 0 yields
sign
(
∂U
∂i
|i=0
)
= sign
{
1− lnz
µ2ρ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
)
[ϕx + µ(ϕy − ϕx)]
}
, (39)
which can be either positive or negative depending on parameter values. It can be seen that the
relative magnitude of downstream-R&D productivity ϕy and upstream-R&D productivity ϕx is
crucial to determine the sign of (39). Therefore, we analyze the following two cases.
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4.1.1 Low Relative Productivity of Downstream R&D
As for the case in which downstream R&D is less productive than upstream R&D, namely
ϕy < ϕx, comparing the first-best production labor (33) and the equilibrium production labor
(36) evaluated at i = 0, we find that the equilibrium at i = 0 features R&D overinvestment (i.e.,
lx|i=0 < l∗x) such that (1 + ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy) < (µ2ρ)/(ϕxlnz). Using this result in the right-hand side
of (39) implies
∂U
∂i
|i=0 > 1− ϕxlnz
µ2ρ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
)
> 0. (40)
Therefore, for ϕy < ϕx, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is sufficient for the Friedman rule to
be suboptimal, because by raising i to be positive, the welfare gains from enhancing consumption
through the increase in lx and from stimulating growth through the increase in lxr (i.e., the cross-
R&D-sector effect) reinforce the welfare gain from overcoming R&D overinvestment through the
decrease in lyr . Nevertheless, it is easy to see that R&D overinvestment is not necessary for the
suboptimality of the Friedman rule; R&D underinvestment implies that ∂U/∂i|i=0 is greater than
a negative value, and a relatively large (small) markup would also enable R&D underinvestment to
make a positive nominal interest rate (a zero nominal interest rate) optimal.8 This implies that the
suboptimality of the Friedman rule can be supported by R&D underinvestment if the welfare gain
from reallocating labor through the increase in lx and lxr dominates the welfare cost from worsening
R&D underinvestment through the decrease in lyr .9 The above analysis is equivalent to show that
R&D underinvestment is necessary for the Friedman rule to be optimal.
4.1.2 High Relative Productivity of Downstream R&D
In contrast, as for the case in which downstream R&D is more productive than upstream R&D,
namely ϕy > ϕx, comparing (33) and (36) at i = 0 shows that R&D underinvestment arises in
the equilibrium where i = 0 (i.e., lx|i=0 > l∗x) such that (1 + ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy) > (µ2ρ)/(ϕylnz) holds.
Hence, we obtain
∂U
∂i
|i=0 < 1− ϕylnz
µ2ρ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
)
< 0, (41)
which implies that R&D underinvestment in equilibrium is sufficient (but not necessary) for the
Friedman rule to be optimal. In this case, by reducing i to zero, the welfare gain from overcoming
R&D underinvestment through the increase in lyr overwhelms the welfare cost from reallocating labor
through the decrease in lx and lxr . In other words, this result also implies that R&D overinvestment
is necessary for the suboptimality of the Friedman rule. However, the degree of R&D overinvestment
has to be sufficiently high in order to make a positive rate of nominal interest optimal, and again, this
can be achieved under a large markup;10 otherwise, R&D overinvestment would also lead the zero
8Specifically, if µ > (<)µ¯ = − lnz
2ρ
(
1 + ρ
ϕx
+ ρ
ϕy
)
(ϕx−ϕy)+
√[
lnz
2ρ
(
1 + ρ
ϕx
+ ρ
ϕy
)
(ϕx − ϕy)
]2
+ ϕxlnz
ρ
(
1 + ρ
ϕx
+ ρ
ϕy
)
,
then i∗ will become positive (zero) even with R&D underinvestment.
9Note that the welfare gain from the cross-R&D-sector effect through the increase in lxr also includes the one from
mitigating the problem of R&D underinvestment.
10If the degree of R&D overinvestment l∗x−lx|i=0 is greater than the threshold value, then the LHS of (39) will suffice
to be positive. Suppose 1−lx|i=0 = 1−l∗x+χ⇔ l∗x = lx|i=0+χ, where χ > 0. There thus exists a threshold value χ¯ such
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nominal interest rate to be optimal. Intuitively, this case implies that by raising i to be positive, two
layers of welfare gains arise from overcoming R&D overinvestment through the decrease in lyr and
from enhancing consumption through the increase in lx. Nonetheless, the cross-R&D-sector effect of
reallocating lyr to lxr yields a welfare cost, since this effect tends to depress growth through the labor
shift from a more productive R&D engine to a less productive one. Therefore, the suboptimality
of the Friedman rule can be supported by R&D overinvestment if the welfare gains dominate the
welfare cost. Notice that this welfare cost is absent in Subsection 4.1.1 since in that case, a higher
i always shifts labor from a less productive R&D engine to a more productive one.
Also, the analytical solution for the optimal interest rate i∗ is found to exist. Using the first-order
condition of U with respect to i, we derive i∗ for ξx = 0 given by
i∗ = max
 µ− 1
lnz
ρ
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)(
ϕy − ϕx
(
µ−1
µ
))
− 1
− 1, 0
 , (42)
and the value of i∗ is chosen based on the sign of ∂U/∂i|i=0 in (39), as analyzed in Subsections 4.1.1
and 4.1.2. The above results are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that only the CIA constraint on downstream R&D is present. Then the op-
timal nominal interest rate i∗ is given by (42). Furthermore, when ϕx > ϕy (ϕx < ϕy), R&D overin-
vestment/underinvestment in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium is sufficient/necessary (nec-
essary/sufficient) for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal/optimal.
Proof. Proven in the text.
As for the comparative statics of i∗ when it is positive, the analysis is similar to those in
Chu and Cozzi (2014), and the intuition is as follows. First, a higher discount rate ρ implies a
worsening of the intertemporal spillover effect, which is a negative externality that leads R&D
overinvestment to be more likely to occur. Thus, i∗ is increasing in ρ. This model features a
(positive) negative surplus-appropriability effect on the productivity in the (downstream) upstream
R&D, in the sense that a higher ϕx/ϕy is more likely to cause R&D overinvestment. Thus, i∗ is
increasing in ϕx/ϕy. Additionally, a larger patent breadth µ strictly increases downstream R&D
and thus R&D overinvestment is more likely to occur. At the same time, a larger µ reinforces the
double marginalization problem in the upstream R&D sector and thus enlarges the welfare gain of
raising i through the increase in the upstream-R&D labor lxr even if R&D is underinvested. Thus,
i∗ is increasing in µ. Finally, a smaller step size z of innovation implies a negative externality that
makes R&D overinvestment more possible, so that i∗ is decreasing in z.
4.2 CIA Constraint on Upstream R&D
Then, we turn to consider optimal monetary policy in a case where the CIA constraint only on
upstream R&D is present. We also normalize the CIA constraint on downstream R&D to unity
that if and only if χ > χ¯, then ∂U/∂i|i=0 > 0. Furthermore, χ¯ is given by (µ− 1)(ϕy−ϕx)(1 +ρ/ϕy +ρ/ϕx)/(ϕyµ2),
which is decreasing in µ. So the degree of R&D overinvestment is more likely to dominate the threshold value under
a large markup.
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for simplicity in this case. Consequently, imposing ξy = 0 and ξx = 1 into (28)-(30) yields the
equilibrium labor allocations such that
lx =
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
1 + µ(µ− 1) + µ−11+i
, (43)
lyr =
µ(µ− 1)
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
1 + µ(µ− 1) + µ−11+i
− ρ
ϕy
, (44)
lxr =
µ−1
1+i
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
1 + µ(µ− 1) + µ−11+i
− ρ
ϕx
. (45)
(43) to (45) show that under ξy = 0, a higher rate of nominal interest i continues to increase the
manufacturing labor lx and decrease (increase) the labor in the constrained (unconstrained) R&D
sector, i.e., the upstream R&D labor lrx (the downstream R&D labor lrx). In addition, substituting
(43) to (45) into (32) and evaluating ∂U/∂i at i = 0 yields
sign
(
∂U
∂i
|i=0
)
= sign
{
1− lnz
µ2ρ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
)
[ϕx + µ(µ− 1)(ϕx − ϕy)]
}
, (46)
which again can be either positive or negative. Analogous to the previous section, we analyze the
sign of (46) by considering the case of ϕy > ϕx and of ϕy < ϕx, respectively.
4.2.1 Low Relative Productivity of Upstream R&D
As for the case of ϕy > ϕx, comparing the first-best production labor (33) and the equilibrium
production labor (43) at i = 0 implies that there is R&D overinvestment in the equilibrium with
i = 0 (i.e., lx|i=0 < l∗x) since (1 + ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy) < (µ2ρ)/(ϕylnz) holds. In this case, using (46), we
obtain
∂U
∂i
|i=0 > 1− ϕylnz
µ2ρ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
)
> 0. (47)
Therefore, for ϕy > ϕx, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is sufficient for the Friedman rule to
be suboptimal, but similar to Subsection 4.1.1, this condition is not necessary. This result implies
that the R&D underinvestment may also cause the suboptimality of the Friedman rule, however, it
is necessary for the optimality of the Friedman rule.
4.2.2 High Relative Productivity of Upstream R&D
As for the case of ϕy < ϕx, comparing (43) and (33) at i = 0 yields (1 + ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy) >
(µ2ρ)/(ϕxlnz), which means that R&D underinvestment arises in the equilibrium where i = 0 (i.e.,
lx|i=0 > l∗x). Then, we can use (46) to obtain
∂U
∂i
|i=0 < 1− ϕxlnz
µ2ρ
(
1 +
ρ
ϕx
+
ρ
ϕy
)
< 0. (48)
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Similar to Subsection 4.1.2, R&D underinvestment in equilibrium is a sufficient but not necessary
condition for the Friedman rule to be optimal. Hence, R&D overinvestment continues to be necessary
for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal, and the suboptimality of the Friedman rule is guaranteed by
a sufficiently high degree of R&D overinvestment; otherwise, a low degree of R&D overinvestment
may lead the Friedman rule to be optimal.
Notice that the intuition for the relationship between the (sub)optimality of the Friedman rule
and R&D overinvestment and underinvestment in Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 is analogous to the
counterpart in Subsection 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, which depends on the interaction between the welfare gains
and costs of labor reallocation, and thus it is omitted to conserve space. Moreover, differentiating
U with respect to i yields the analytical solution for the optimal nominal interest rate i∗ for ξy = 0
given by
i∗ = max
 1
lnz
ρ
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)(
ϕx
(
µ+ 1µ−1
)
− ϕyµ
)
−
(
µ+ 1µ−1
) − 1, 0
 , (49)
and the selection of the value for i∗ follows the analysis in Subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.2. We summarize
the above results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Suppose that only the CIA constraint on upstream R&D is present. Then the opti-
mal nominal interest rate i∗ is given by (49). Furthermore, when ϕy > ϕx (ϕy < ϕx), R&D overin-
vestment/underinvestment in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium is sufficient/necessary (nec-
essary/sufficient) for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal/optimal.
Proof. Proven in the text.
Again, investigating (49) shows that i∗, when it is positive, is increasing in ρ and ϕy/ϕx, but
decreasing in z. The intuitions for these results are similar to that in Section 4.1. Nevertheless,
in this case, i∗ can be increasing or decreasing in µ. The reason that i∗ increases in response to a
larger µ also follows from the counterpart in Section 4.1. The difference is that the CIA constraint
is now imposed on the upstream R&D sector. This makes the double marginalization problem less
severe when the level of µ becomes higher, which mitigates the welfare effect of increasing i. And
if this welfare effect is significantly attenuated, it is also possible for i∗ to decrease in response to a
larger µ.
4.3 CIA Constraints on Two Sectors
In this section, we consider that both downstream and upstream R&D sectors are subject to CIA
constraints, and the strength of the CIA constraints on the two sectors is equal, namely ξx = ξy = ξ,
where we normalize ξ = 1 for analytical simplicity in this case as in the previous two subsections.
For a complete analysis, we later on allow the strength of the CIA constraints on the two sectors to
differ in the numerical exercise. Under this setting, the equilibrium labor allocations are given by
lx =
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
1 + µ
2−1
1+i
, (50)
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lyr =
µ(µ−1)
1+i
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
1 + µ
2−1
1+i
− ρ
ϕy
, (51)
lxr =
µ−1
1+i
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
1 + µ
2−1
1+i
− ρ
ϕx
. (52)
Substituting (50)-(52) into (32) and evaluating it at i = 0 yields
sign
(
∂U
∂i
|i=0
)
= sign
{
1− 1
µ2
− lnz(µ− 1)
µ4
(
1 +
ρ
ϕy
+
ρ
ϕx
)
[µϕy + ϕx]
}
. (53)
In contrast to the previous cases for the CIA parameters imposition, under ξx = ξy = 1, a higher
rate of nominal interest i increases the manufacturing labor lx by decreasing the R&D labor l
y
r and
lxr in both upstream and downstream sectors. Similarly, we then separate the analysis of the sign
in (53) by ϕy > ϕx and ϕy < ϕx, respectively.
4.3.1 Low Relative Productivity of Upstream R&D
As for the case ϕy > ϕx, comparing l∗x in (33) and lx in (50) at i = 0, we find that the equilibrium
features R&D overinvestment since (1+ρ/ϕx+ρ/ϕy) < (µ2ρ)/(ϕylnz). Therefore, using (52) implies
∂U
∂i
|i=0 > µ− 1
µ2
(
1− ϕx
ϕy
)
> 0. (54)
In other words, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium is sufficient for the Friedman rule to be subop-
timal, and obviously, this condition is not necessary. Again, as in the previous subsections, R&D
underinvestment may also make the Friedman rule suboptimal, and it is the necessary condition for
the optimality of the Friedman rule.11
4.3.2 High Relative Productivity of Upstream R&D
As for the case ϕy < ϕx, comparing l∗x in (33) and lx in (50) at i = 0 yields (1 + ρ/ϕx + ρ/ϕy) <
(µ2ρ)/(ϕxlnz), implying that there is also R&D overinvestment in the equilibrium. Therefore, we
obtain
∂U
∂i
|i=0 > µ(µ− 1)
µ2
(
1− ϕy
ϕx
)
> 0. (55)
As a result, R&D overinvestment in equilibrium continues to be a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition that guarantees the suboptimality of the Friedman rule; R&D underinvestment in this
case is necessary for the Friedman rule to be optimal.
The above analysis implies that ξx = ξy = 1, when the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium
features R&D overinvestment, by raising i to be positive, the welfare gain from mitigating R&D
11Analogously, a large (small) value of markup µ can ensure the (sub)optimality of the Friedman rule under ϕy > ϕx
when ξy = ξx = 1.
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overinvestment through the decrease in lyr and lxr reinforces the welfare gain from reallocating labor
through the increase in lx. By contrast, when the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium features
R&D underinvestment, if the welfare gain from reallocating labor through the increase in lx domi-
nates the welfare cost from exacerbating R&D underinvestment through the decrease in lyr and lxr ,
R&D underinvestment would also make the Friedman rule suboptimal; otherwise, the Friedman rule
becomes optimal. This result is invariant to the relative productivity between the sectoral R&D.
Additionally, we derive the optimal nominal interest rate i∗ for ξx = ξy = 1 by differentiating U
with respect to i, which is given by
i∗ = max
 µ2 − 1
lnz
ρ
(
1 + ρϕx +
ρ
ϕy
)
(ϕx + ϕyµ)
1
1+µ − 1
− 1, 0
 , (56)
and the value for i∗ is chosen according to the analysis in Subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Then, we
summarize the above results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Suppose that the CIA constraints on both R&D sectors are equally present. Then
the optimal nominal interest rate i∗ is given by (56). Furthermore, R&D overinvestment (under-
investment) in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilibrium is sufficient (necessary) for the Friedman
rule to be suboptimal (optimal), regardless of the relative productivity of upstream R&D is low or
high.
Proof. Proven in the text.
Notice that the comparative statics of i∗ in (56) on ρ and z are similar to the previous sections.
Moreover, i∗ is increasing in µ. This is because now both R&D sectors are subject to an equal
CIA constraint, and an increase in µ will increase lxr and l
y
r together. Therefore, i∗ must increase
unambiguously to reduce the R&D labor in the two sectors in response. What is different here is that
a higher ϕy/ϕx can either increase or decrease i∗, and it depends on the level of µ. Specifically, if µ
is large (small), then raising ϕy/ϕx will decrease (increase) i∗; the double-marginalization problem
will intensify (attenuate) the effect of a relatively low level of ϕx on the upstream-R&D labor lxr ,
so R&D underinvestment (overinvestment) is more likely to occur and i∗ would response to decline
(rise).
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we calibrate this two-R&D-sector model to the US economy to quantitatively
analyze the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy.
5.1 Calibration
To perform this numerical analysis, the strategy is to assign steady-state values to the following
structural parameters {ρ, µ, ξx, ξy, z, ϕx, ϕy}. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the
discount rate ρ to 0.05. As for the level of patent breadth, we set µ = 1.1 as the baseline to capture
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the empirical finding from Jones and Williams (2000) (i.e., 1.05 − 1.4) and Laitner and Stolyarov
(2004) (i.e., 1.09 − 1.1). As for the strength of the CIA constraints on upstream and downstream
R&D activities, we first choose {ξx = ξy = 1} to correspond to the case as in Section 4.3 where the
CIA constraints on both sectors are identical, and thereafter choose the groups {ξx = 0, ξy = 1}
and {ξx = 1, ξy = 0}, which are the cases where a CIA constraint is only present in the downstream
(i.e., Section 4.1) and upstream sector (i.e., Section 4.2), respectively.
Furthermore, we use the arrival rate of innovation and the equilibrium growth rate to calibrate
the quality step size of innovation. The arrival rate of innovation is set to 6.5%, which is a reasonable
value consistent with empirical estimates.12 According to the Conference Board Total Economy
Database, the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) for the US economy from 1990-2016
is approximately 0.5%. Thus, we consider g = 0.005 as the benchmark value and the quality step
size is then calibrated to z = 1.08.13 To calibrate the remaining R&D productivity parameters ϕx
and ϕy, in addition to the benchmark growth rate, we use another empirical moment: the ratio
of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D over manufacturing labor force.14 The average ratio is
around 5.7%, indicating (1− lx)/lx = 0.057 and then the aggregate R&D labor ratio lyr + lxr = 1− lx
is around 0.05.15
The population growth rate is set to n = 0.01 to correspond the data during 1990-2016 according
to the Conference Board Total Economy Database. The market-level nominal interest rate i is
calibrated by targeting at pi = 2.5%, which is the average annual inflation rate of the US economy
within this period according to Bureau of Labor Statistics. Hence, the benchmark value of the
nominal interest rate is given by i = r + pi = g + ρ+ n+ pi = 0.09. Table 1 summarizes the values
of parameters and variables in this quantitative exercise.16
Table 1: Parameter Values in Baseline Calibration
Targets r l
y
r + lxr g pi
0.065 0.05 0.005 0.025
Parameters ξy ξx z µ ϕy ϕx i
1 1 1.08 1.1 0.5265 1.3136 0.09
12In the literature, studies have considered different values for the arrival rate of innovations. For example, Caballero
and Jaffe (2002) estimate a mean rate of creative destruction of roughly 4% and Laitner and Stolyarov (2013) find
3.5% per year of the rate of creative destruction, while Lanjouw (1998) estimates the probability of obsolescence is
the range of 7%− 12%. Here, we consider an intermediate value of 6.5% within this range.
13The quality step size is calibrated according to z = exp(0.005/0.065) ≈ 1.08.
14The number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D for 1990-1997 are from Science and Engineering Indicators
2000 (Appendix Tables 3-25) published by National Science Foundation. The data of manufacturing labor employee
is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
15When using the data for a even longer period such as 1980-1997, the average ratio remains almost unchanged,
although a slightly increasing trend of R&D labor ratio can be observed. Thus, we leave the robustness check on a
larger R&D labor ratio in the sensitivity analysis by taking into account the possibly increasing trend of R&D labor
ratio.
16When solving for the values of ϕx and ϕy, we restrict to positive values ensuring that the R&D labor allocations
of lyr and lxr are positive.
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5.2 Growth and Welfare Implications of Monetary Policy
This subsection evaluates the growth and welfare effects of inflation in the case of an equal CIA
constraint on both R&D sectors.
Fig.1a displays that for ξx = ξy = 1, the growth rate of technology is monotonically decreasing
in the inflation rate. According to (51) and (52), a higher nominal interest rate i raises the cost of
both downstream and upstream R&D due to CIA constraints in these sectors. A negative growth
effect emerges since labor is reallocated from R&D to manufacturing. As discussed in Subsection
3.2, a positive growth effect of a higher nominal interest rate may arise given the presence of the
cross-R&D-sector effect; R&D labor is shifted from a more cash-constrained sector to the less-
constrained one, but this potentially growth-enhancing effect does not appear when the strength of
CIA constraints is equal.17 As a result, a higher nominal interest rate (and inflation rate) leads to
a monotonic decrease in the rate of economic growth.
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Fig. 1. (a) Inflation and economic growth (ξx = ξy) (b) Inflation and social welfare (ξx = ξy)
Moreover, the level of steady-state welfare is also decreasing in the inflation rate for ξx = ξy = 1
as shown in Fig.1b. According to (32), the effects of a higher nominal interest rate i on steady-state
welfare U operate through the steady-state level of consumption c0, determined by the production
labor lx, and the growth rate of technology g, determined by the R&D labors in two sectors lxr and l
y
r .
From (28)-(30), it can be seen that a higher i leads to a rise in lx and then c0, indicating a positive
welfare effect, whereas it leads to a decline in lxr and l
y
r and then g, implying a negative welfare
effect. In this case, the latter negative welfare effect always dominates the former positive one. In
addition, when expressing it as the usual equivalent variation in consumption flow κ ≡ exp(ρ∆U)−1,
the welfare gain can be as large as approximately 1% of consumption per annum when moving the
equilibrium at i = 0.2140 (p¯i = 0.15, the upper bound of inflation rate)18 to the second-best outcome
17The quantitative results indicate that both downstream and upstream R&D labors are decreasing in the nominal
interest rate, and, of course, the manufacturing labor is increasing in it in response.
18Throughout the quantitative analysis, we restrict our analysis on an empirically realistic case of the inflation rate
pi ≤ 0.15. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics, the maximum of quarterly and annual inflation rate for US economy
are 0.136 and 0.124, respectively, from 1958 (when the indicator is available) to 2016. Thus, to cover these empirical
moments, we consider a slightly large value 0.15 as the upper bound of inflation rate. Correspondingly, the upper
bound of nominal interest rate is around 0.2140 in the benchmark case by solving the function of i−g(i)−ρ−n = 0.15.
21
(i.e., the equilibrium at i = 0).
To see how R&D overinvestment or underinvestment in the zero-nominal-interest-rate equilib-
rium (i.e., i = 0) relates to the optimality or suboptimality of Friedman rule, we compare the
socially optimal manufacturing labor l∗x and the market equilibrium manufacturing labor lx|i=0.
The calibrated productivity parameters, ϕy = 0.5265 and ϕx = 1.3136, indicate a high relative
productivity of upstream R&D. Thus, using (33)-(35), the socially optimal labor allocations are
given by l∗x = 0.4946, l
y∗
r = 0, and lx∗r = 0.5054, respectively. Evaluating (50) at i = 0 yields the
equilibrium manufacturing labor of lx = 0.9364, which implies lx|i=0 > l∗x. This shows that relative
to the first-best allocation, much less R&D labor is assigned in equilibrium. According to (56), the
optimal nominal interest rate is therefore given by i∗ = 0, which is the lower bound on the nominal
interest rate. In this case, the Friedman rule is optimal for which R&D underinvestment is the
necessary condition, as shown in Proposition 5, but setting i to its optimal level cannot achieve the
first-best labor allocations.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we undertake sensitivity checks to test the robustness of our quantitative
results. Specifically, we first examine the cases of only one CIA constraint is present in either sector
to correspond to our analytical analysis in Subsection 4.1 and Subsection 4.2, respectively.19 We
also consider a less severe CIA constraint equally imposed in both sectors. Thereafter, sensitivity
exercises on markup and R&D labor ratio are conducted, respectively. Before closing the analy-
sis, we show that the inverted-U growth effect of inflation rate, as indicated in Proposition 2, is
quantitatively available when the markup and CIA parameters are simultaneously adjusted.
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis
Parameters ξy ξx µ ϕy ϕx l
y
r + lxr
1 0 1.1 0.7268 1.0404 0.07‡
- - - 1.0348 0.7296 0.07
0 1 1.1 0.5265 1.3136 0.05
0.5 0.5 1.1 0.5265 1.3136 0.05
1 1 1.2 0.5265 1.3136 0.05
1 1 1.26 0.5265 1.3136 0.05
1 1 1.14 0.7311 0.5857 0.095§
1 0.01 1.69 0.5265 1.3136 0.05
Note: ‡ and § represent the sensitivity checks in which the
parameters ϕy and ϕx are re-calibrated to match the R&D
intensity as indicated. Additionally, in the case of ‡, there are
two groups of productivity parameters generated.
19We have also considered the case that CIA constraint is exclusively present on consumption. Unsurprisingly,
when labor is elastically supplied, the presence of CIA constraint on consumption leads a higher nominal interest rate
to reduce economic growth rate and social welfare through a conventional effect of decreasing the aggregate labor
supply as well as labor supplies in both R&D sectors.
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5.3.1 CIA parameters
First, in the case of a CIA constraint on downstream R&D sector only (i.e., ξx = 0, ξy = 1), the
benchmark value of aggregate R&D labor ratio is adjusted to a slightly larger one, such as 7%.20 The
two sectoral productivity parameters are then re-calibrated and yielded, ϕy = 0.7268 < 1.0404 = ϕx
and ϕy = 1.0348 > 0.7296 = ϕx. Fig.2a and Fig.3a display the growth effects of inflation for ϕy < ϕx
and ϕy > ϕx. When the CIA constraint is only present in the downstream R&D sector, raising
the nominal interest rate increases the R&D cost for only the downstream sector and hence shifts
its R&D labor to its upstream and manufacturing counterparts. However, the growth-enhancing
effect of inflation brought about by the increase in upstream R&D labor is unable to dominate the
growth-retarding effect because only a small fraction of lyr that is shifted out flows to upstream
R&D sector. Therefore, the growth rate of technology is decreasing in the inflation rate as the
benchmark case, regardless of high or low relative productivity of downstream R&D. It is useful to
note that the magnitudes of growth-decreasing effect of inflation differ slightly because when only
downstream R&D suffers from cash constraint, a higher nominal interest rate would strengthen the
growth-retarding effect when its own productivity is higher than the upstream R&D.
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Fig. 2. (a) Inflation and economic growth (ξx < ξy) (b) Inflation and social welfare (ξx < ξy)
By contrast, the welfare effects of inflation differ in the cases of ϕy < ϕx and ϕy > ϕx. When low
relative productivity of downstream R&D occurs in the economy, the level of social welfare is now a
concave function of inflation rate, displayed in Fig.2b, unlike the baseline case. As mentioned above,
the welfare effect of inflation relies on its impacts on lx and g. When only the downstream sector
suffers from the CIA constraint, the positive welfare effect from an increase in lx initially dominates
the negative effect because of a decrease in g. However, as the welfare-increasing effect becomes
weaker, it is eventually dominated by the welfare-decreasing effect when the inflation rate is above
the threshold value of pi = 8.68% (i = 0.1516). In this case, raising the nominal interest rate from
i = 0 to the second-best equilibrium (i = 0.1516) yields a marginal welfare gain of κ = 0.0072%.
To examine the Proposition 3, we show that the first-best labor allocations are l∗x = 0.6245,
20We recalibrate the productivity parameters by using an alternative R&D labor ratio because in the case of ξx = 0
and ξy = 1, using the benchmark values would lead the downstream R&D labor lyr to be negative when pi ≥ 0.028,
which strictly restricts our analysis.
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ly∗r = 0, and lx∗r = 0.3755, given that the downstream R&D sector is less productive herein (i.e.,
ϕy = 0.7268 < 1.0404 = ϕx). The equilibrium manufacturing labor at i = 0 is lx = 0.9230
according to (36), implying lx|i=0 > l∗x. Therefore, again, R&D underinvestment occurs in the zero-
nominal-interest-rate equilibrium. Nevertheless, according to Proposition 3, the Friedman rule can
be suboptimal under a sufficiently large markup. Since the markup µ = 1.1 in this case is larger than
the threshold value of markup (µ¯ = 1.0947) as given in footnote 8, a positive welfare-maximizing
inflation rate is present.
In the alternative case of a high relative productivity of downstream R&D, ϕy = 1.0348 > ϕx =
0.7296, social welfare becomes monotonically decreasing in inflation, although R&D underinvest-
ment is still the case, lx|i=0 = 0.9230 > l∗x = 0.6278. It is coherent with analytical findings in
Proposition 3 that R&D underinvestment in the case of high relative productivity of downstream
R&D suffices to ensure the optimality of Friedman rule. Thus, the largest welfare difference between
the equilibrium at i = 0.2140 (corresponding to the upper bound of pi = 0.15), and the second-best
equilibrium (the equilibrium at i = 0 again) is κ = 0.8531%. This result is new to the implication
of monetary policy regarding the relationship with the underinvestment versus overinvestment of
R&D and complements Chu and Cozzi (2014) who consider the welfare effect of monetary policy in
a Schumpeterian economy with a single R&D sector.
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Fig. 3. (a) Inflation and economic growth (ξx < ξy) (b) Inflation and social welfare (ξx < ξy)
Second, Fig.4a illustrates the growth effect of inflation when only the upstream R&D activities
are subject to a CIA constraint (i.e., ξx = 1, ξy = 0). Other parameters remain unchanged as
those in the baseline case. According to Proposition 2, given a low relative sectoral productivity in
downstream, an increase in the inflation rate is not able to yield a sufficiently positive growth rate
arising from the less constrained R&D sector (the upstream sector herein) to dominate the negative
growth rate arising from the more constrained R&D sector (the downstream sector herein). Because
of this weak cross-sector effect, an increase in the inflation rate results in a lower rate of technology
growth. In addition, a comparison between Fig.1a and Fig.4a indicates that the absence of the CIA
constraint in the downstream R&D sector mitigates the growth-retarding effect of a higher inflation
and therefore leads to a smoother relationship between the growth rate and the inflation rate.
The welfare effect of inflation for the case with ξx = 1 and ξy = 0 is illustrated in Fig.4b. It is
obvious that an increase in the inflation rate causes welfare losses in this case. When the nominal
24
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Fig. 4. (a) Inflation and economic growth (ξx > ξy) (b) Inflation and social welfare (ξx > ξy)
interest rate i increases, the positive welfare effect from an increase in the steady-state level of
consumption c0 through raising the labor employment of manufacturing lx is completely dominated
by the negative welfare effect from the growth-decreasing effect. The welfare gain between the
equilibrium at i = 0.214521 and the welfare-maximizing outcome (the equilibrium at i = 0) in
this case is κ = 1.531%, implying a more severe welfare loss as compared to the baseline case.
It arises because given the low relative downstream productivity, when it no longer suffers from
cash constraint (i.e., ξy = 0), a higher i always increases the downstream R&D labor whereas the
upstream R&D labor, also the high relative productive, decreases more than the benchmark case.
As a consequence, the welfare loss rises because of the even more inefficient labor reallocation.
Furthermore, we obtain lx|i=0 > l∗x, which, again, implies R&D underinvestment. Hence, the
quantitative result is consistent with the Proposition 4 in the sense that R&D underinvestment is
a sufficient condition for the optimality of Friedman rule.
Finally, we perform a sensitivity analysis by considering the two equal CIA constraint parameters
at a less severe level, i.e., ξx = ξy = 0.5. The growth and welfare effects of increasing the inflation
rate are similar to those in the case of ξx = ξy = 1, except for the magnitudes. Specifically, when the
extents of the cash constraint are simultaneously lowered, an increase in the inflation rate generates
a more moderate effect on the labor reallocation among the R&D and manufacturing sectors. As
a result, an increase in the nominal interest rate from 0 to 0.2140 leads to a smaller decline in the
growth rate in Fig.5a and the welfare level in Fig.5b, respectively, as compared to Fig.1a and Fig.1b.
The largest welfare gain between the equilibrium at i = 0.214922 and the second-best outcome (the
equilibrium at i = 0) in this case is κ = 0.5281%, a less welfare loss as compared the benchmark.
It is understandable that since the second-best outcome is the same with the case of ξx = ξy = 1, a
less severe CIA constraint alleviates welfare losses due to an increase in the nominal interest rate.
21The upper bound of inflation rate of 0.15 corresponds to i = 0.2145 in this case. It is obtained by solving the
function indicated in footnote 18.
22The upper bound of inflation rate of 0.15 corresponds to i = 0.2149 in this case.
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Fig. 5. (a) Inflation and economic growth (ξx = ξy) (b) Inflation and social welfare (ξx = ξy)
5.3.2 Markup
To assess the role of markup in the growth and welfare effect of inflation, we first consider a larger
markup, i.e., µ = 1.2, remaining other parameters unchanged as in the baseline case. The growth-
retarding and welfare-decreasing effect of inflation are still found in Fig.6a and Fig.6b, respectively.
A comparison to Fig.1a reveals that raising the markup increases the level of growth rate. It
works through promoting downstream R&D labor allocations and thus spurring the growth rate
of technology, although a smaller magnitude of growth-retarding effect arises as well by decreasing
upstream R&D labor employment. Fig.1b and Fig.6b together shows that a higher markup increases
the welfare level through raising the level of growth rate, whereas it does not alter the relationship
between inflation and social welfare. Thus, the welfare-maximizing equilibrium is still at i = 0,
and the welfare losses between it and the equilibrium i = 0.2228, referring to the upper bound of
pi = 0.15 in this case, is κ = 0.5872%.
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Fig. 6. (a) Inflation and economic growth (µ = 1.2) (b) Inflation and social welfare (µ = 1.2)
Interestingly, when continuing to raise the markup to a even larger value such that µ = 1.26,
we find that although the growth rate of aggregate technology is still monotonically decreasing in
inflation rate, social welfare becomes a concave function of inflation, with a welfare-maximizing
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inflation rate pi = 3.94% (i = 0.1180). It is consistent with our analytical results shown in 4.3.2
in the sense that the welfare-maximization nominal interest rate i∗ is increasing in µ, and R&D
underinvestment could also lead to the suboptimality of Friedman rule in the support of a higher
markup.23 As shown in 4.3.2, a higher i∗ is always required to counteract the increase in both
R&D labor because of a larger markup. Consequently, with a sufficiently large markup, the optimal
nominal interest rate turns positive. The quantitative results are reported in Fig.7a and Fig.7b.
The level of growth rate and social welfare certainly rise as higher markups strengthen the effect of
inflation on labor allocations, bringing about the possibility that the increase in lx due to a higher
i, contributing to a higher c0, can dominate the welfare-decreasing effect for lower growth rates.
Thus, the welfare gain by increasing i = 0 to the welfare-maximizing i = 0.1180 is κ = 0.078%.
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Fig. 7. (a) Inflation and economic growth (µ = 1.26) (b) Inflation and social welfare (µ = 1.26)
5.3.3 R&D labor ratio
As shown in the above quantitative results, the ratio of R&D labor over manufacturing labor
matters in the growth and welfare effects of inflation. Here, we use a larger value of R&D labor ratio,
i.e. 9.5%, to examine the change of results in comparison to the benchmark case. We are especially
interested in the case of R&D overinvestment, and find that when simultaneously adjusting to a
larger markup (i.e., 1.14), R&D overinvestment emerges. The productivity parameters in both R&D
sectors are re-calibrated to match this new R&D labor ratio, ϕy = 0.7311 > 0.5857 = ϕx.24 The
growth and welfare effect of inflation are reported in Fig.8a and Fig.8b, respectively. The growth
effect of inflation under a higher R&D intensity is similar with the benchmark case, which can be
seen by comparing Fig.8a with Fig.1a. Nevertheless, the Friedman rule is no longer optimal and it is
new that R&D overinvestment arises. Given the high relative productivity of downstream R&D, the
social optimal labor allocations are l∗x = 0.8886, l
y∗
r = 0.1114, and lx∗r = 0, and the manufacturing
labor allocation at i = 0 is lx|i=0 = 0.8878 > l∗x, indicating that R&D overinvestment at zero-
nominal-interest-rate equilibrium. According to 4.3.1, in the case of low relative productivity of
23In this case, R&D is underinvested such that lx|i=0 = 0.7137 > l∗x = 0.4946.
24When recalibrating the model, another productivity group is also generated, ϕy = 0.5537 < 0.7880 = ϕx. In this
case, the growth and welfare effects of inflation are similar with the benchmark case, without providing any new and
interesting insights. Thus, we do not report the results here, but they are available upon request.
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upstream R&D, R&D overinvestment at equilibrium i = 0 is sufficient for the Friedman rule to
be suboptimal. The welfare is an inverted-U function of inflation with the the welfare-maximizing
inflation rate 0.625 larger than the upper bound of inflation rate 0.15. Thus the optimal strategy,
in terms of welfare-maximization, is raising the nominal interest rate from i = 0 to i = 0.2140,
corresponding to pi = 0.15, and the associated welfare gain is κ = 0.3106%.
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Fig. 8. (a) Inflation and economic growth (b) Inflation and social welfare.
5.3.4 Inverted-U effect of inflation on growth
Lastly, when raising the markup to µ = 1.69,25 and simultaneously adjusting the two CIA
constraint parameters to ξx = 0.01 and ξy = 1,26 we find that the growth effect of aggregate
technology is an inverted-U function of inflation. Fig.9a and Fig.9b show the growth and welfare
effect of inflation, respectively. The intuition for an inverted-U effect of inflation on growth can be
explained as follow. According to Proposition 2, given the support of a large markup as well as
a less CIA constraint in upstream R&D sector, an increase in the nominal interest rate i is able
to yield a sufficiently positive growth rate of technology, through increasing its R&D labor, that
can dominate the negative effect stemming from the more constrained sector (downstream sector)
where R&D labor is decreasing in i. Thus, monetary policy is growth-enhancing, before i rises to
the threshold value above which the above-mentioned domination is reversed because the growth-
enhancing effect from upstream sector becomes weaker while the growth-retarding effect from the
downstream sector continues to strengthen. Overall, the inverted-U effect of inflation on the growth
rate of aggregate technology emerges. In addition, the growth-maximization inflation rate is found
to be around 2.68%, which is line with the empirical estimates of Ghosh and Phillips (1998) (i.e.,
2.5%) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) (i.e., 2.7%).
25Comin (2004) shows that the markups charged by innovators should be well above the generally estimated average
markup in the economy. Thus it is not unrealistic to consider a higher markup of µ = 1.69.
26It is useful to note that according to Proposition 2, either setting any one CIA constraint to zero or choosing any
parameter groups with equal CIA constraints will lead to a monotonic effect of i on g. Moreover, given the low relative
productivity of downstream R&D productivity, a positive growth effect of inflation is available when the upstream
R&D sector features less cash constrained than its downstream counterpart. Intuitively, the growth-enhancing effect
of inflation is possible when the labor reallocation acts in the way of from the less productive sector to the more
productive one.
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Furthermore, the level of welfare is a concave function of inflation, indicating that the Fried-
man rule is suboptimal. However, the interior solution for the welfare-maximizing inflation rate is
tremendously large and exceeds the upper bound pi = 0.15. Therefore, the monetary authority is
able to lead the economy to the second-best equilibrium at i = 0.2488 (i.e., pi = 0.15), and the
largest welfare gains is the gap between i = 0 and i = 0.2488 yielding κ = 8.1950%.
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Fig. 9. (a) Inflation and economic growth (b) Inflation and social welfare.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we analyze the growth and welfare effects of monetary policy in a Schumpeterian
growth model in which both vertical sectors engage in R&D activities and CIA constraints are
present in R&D investments. We find that a higher nominal interest rate reallocates resources from
the more-cash-constrained R&D sector to the less one. In addition to the usual growth-retarding
effect of CIA constraints by increasing the cost of R&D, this cross-sector reallocation on R&D
labor generates a growth-enhancing effect, which would lead economic growth to have an inverted-
U shape on the nominal interest rate. Moreover, we examine the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the (sub)optimality of the Friedman rule by relating the underinvestment and overinvestment
of R&D in the decentralized equilibrium. We find that this relationship is crucially affected by
the presence of CIA constraints, the relative productivity between upstream R&D and downstream
R&D, and the strength of markup, given that these factors determine the interaction between the
welfare effects brought by the reallocation on different types of labor, and thus the optimal design
of monetary policy. Finally, by calibrating this two-R&D-sector model to the US economy, our
quantitative results suggest that the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing rates of nominal
interest are generally zero, i.e., they are given by the Friedman rule. Also, it is found that the welfare
effect of monetary policy is quantitatively significant by altering the nominal interest rate from the
steady-state value to the optimal value. Therefore, our analysis serves to provide an analytical and
quantitative justification that reveals the importance of taking into account R&D investments in an
economy with vertical industries when considering the role of monetary policy in economic growth
and social welfare.
29
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that a time path of [it]∞t=0 is stationary. First, define a transformed variable Ψy,t ≡
Ntet/vy,t, and its law of motion is given by
Ψ˙y,t
Ψy,t
= n+
e˙t
et
− v˙y,t
vy,t
. (A.1)
Similarly, define another transformed variable Ψx,t ≡ Ntet/vx,t, and its law of motion is given by
Ψ˙x,t
Ψx,t
= n+
e˙t
et
− v˙x,t
vx,t
. (A.2)
To derive the law of motion for vy,t, substituting (13) into (20) yields
v˙y,t
vy,t
= rt + ϕyl
y
r,t −
(
µ− 1
µ
)
Ψy,t. (A.3)
Likewise, combining (17) and (21) yields the law of motion for vx,t such that
v˙x,t
vx,t
= rt + ϕxl
x
r,t −
(
µ− 1
µ2
)
Ψx,t. (A.4)
Plugging (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1) and (A.2) respectively, along with the Euler equation (6), yields
Ψ˙y,t
Ψy,t
=
(
µ− 1
µ
)
Ψy,t − ϕylyr,t − ρ, (A.5)
and
Ψ˙x,t
Ψx,t
=
(
µ− 1
µ2
)
Ψx,t − ϕxlxr,t − ρ. (A.6)
Also, using the zero-expected-profit condition of upstream R&D (24) yields an expression of lx,t
such that
lx,t =
(
1 + ξyi
µ2ϕy
)
Ψy,t, (A.7)
and using (25) to relate lx,t to Ψx,t yields
lx,t =
(
1 + ξxi
µ2ϕx
)
Ψx,t. (A.8)
Now, Ψx,t can be expressed as a function of Ψy,t such that
Ψx,t =
[
(1 + ξyi)ϕx
(1 + ξxi)ϕy
]
Ψy,t. (A.9)
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Therefore, it is obvious that
Ψ˙y,t
Ψy,t
=
Ψ˙x,t
Ψx,t
. (A.10)
Using (A.10) together with (A.5), (A.6) and (A.9), we derive a relationship between lyr,t and lxr,t such
that
lxr,t =
(
ϕy
ϕx
)
lyr,t +
[
(µ− 1)(1 + ξyi)ϕx
µ2ϕy(1 + ξxi)
− µ− 1
µ
]
Ψy,t
ϕx
. (A.11)
Finally, to derive the relationship between Ψy,t and l
y
r,t, using the labor-market-clearing condition
lx,t + l
y
r,t + l
x
r,t = 1 and substituting (A.7) and (A.11) into it yields(
1 +
ϕy
ϕx
)
lyr,t = 1−
[
1 + ξyi
ϕy
+
(µ− 1)(1 + ξyi)
ϕyµ2(1 + ξxi)
− µ− 1
µϕx
]
Ψy,t. (A.12)
Substituting (A.12) into (A.6) yields an autonomous dynamical equation for Ψy,t such that
Ψ˙y,t
Ψy,t
=
ϕx
ϕy + ϕx
[
1 + ξyi
µ2
(
1 +
µ− 1
1 + ξxi
)
+
µ− 1
µ
]
Ψy,t −
(
ϕxϕy
ϕy + ϕx
+ ρ
)
. (A.13)
Given that Ψy,t is a control variable and the coefficient on Ψy,t is positive in (A.13), the dynamics
of Ψy,t is characterized by saddle-point stability in this model such that Ψy,t jumps immediately to
its interior steady-state value given by
Ψy =
µ2[ρ(1 + ϕy/ϕx) + ϕy]
(1 + ξyi) [1 + (µ− 1)/(1 + ξxi)] + µ(µ− 1) . (A.14)
Equations (A.7) and (A.14) imply that when Ψy,t is stationary, lx,t and l
y
r,t must be stationary,
which in turn implies that lxr,t is stationary as well according to (A.11). Hence, lt must also be
stationary.
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